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v
The Rule of Which Law?
The Use of Legal Language in the 
Rhetoric of the anni di piombo*
Eleanor Spaventa
In this chapter, I will focus on an instrumental use of certain key legal concepts 
during the early stage of left-wing terrorist activity in the 1970s, in order to 
highlight how legal language is appropriated by all the main actors: the state, 
the terrorists and the victims themselves. These three main actors all do this in 
different ways, but to achieve the same end: they use legal concepts to transform 
subjective statements into objective, and even moral, truths. In this sense, the use 
of legal rhetoric can be seen both as the meeting ground and as the ground where a 
symbolic battle is fought. The way these three actors use legal language ref lect some 
of the tensions which profoundly divided Italy during the anni di piombo.
The entire debate is always tainted by legal rhetoric: the state is at once created 
by, and creator of, law; the state cannot exist without the law, and the law cannot 
exist without the state — whatever form each of those entities takes. It is therefore 
natural that the attack on the state should be perceived as an attack against the 
law, specifically lo stato di diritto (the ‘rule of law’).1 Needless to say, any state, any 
organization, would have difficulties recognizing as an interlocutor someone who 
is not playing according to the rules of the game, of its game; and the Italian state 
in the 1970s relied heavily on legal notions, as well as political ones, to justify the 
response given to those who placed themselves outside its boundaries, be those 
moral or legal. This instrumental use of legal rhetoric is not exclusive to the state: 
the Brigate Rosse (BR), as well as at least some of their prisoners (first Mario 
Sossi and later Aldo Moro), also used legal language to reinforce their claims. 
Those claims cannot, however, by their very definition, be reconciled. Political 
tension is therefore replayed as well as exemplified in the clash of legal rhetoric. It 
is for this reason that an investigation into the way legal rhetoric is appropriated 
by different actors might be useful, although of course such an investigation also 
begs the broader, and unanswerable, question as to whether the law can ever be 
perceived in an apolitical fashion (which of course is not to say that the law cannot 
be enforced in a non-political fashion). What is obvious, and to a certain extent 
accepted, is that law plays a predominant role both in the fight against the state, 
and in the fight against terror; the law plays a predominant part in providing some 
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sort of justification for the actions taken, be they subversive or defensive. Thus the 
law is used to provide some sort of normative justification for a political action, in 
the attempt to catapult the debate from a subjective moral ground to an objectified 
legal ground. In other words, legal rhetoric is used as an instrument to demonstrate, 
support, and universalize the rightness of one’s action beyond the realm of political 
debate, which necessarily always stems from a partisan perspective where the result 
follows only if the premise is accepted.
In order to illustrate these points, I will start by analysing the kidnapping of 
Judge Mario Sossi through his published diary,2 and then turn to the rhetoric used 
by the terrorists and the state. It is important to stress that Sossi’s diary was written 
between 1978 and 1979, four years after the kidnapping took place and, not by 
coincidence, in the aftermath of the Moro case. Thus, Sossi’s account has a narrative 
significance, subjective rather than objective in nature. And, as with any subjective 
account it is tainted by both a political stand and a possible re-interpretation of 
what happened; and yet, such re-interpretation is by no means hidden: Sossi’s 
embellishments of his own character as well as his political views appear more than 
evident throughout the book.
The Sossi affaire: instrumental use of language by the victim
Judge Mario Sossi, kidnapped in April 1974, was targeted by the BR for two main 
reasons. More generally, the BR perceived him to be a reactionary judge who 
instrumentally used the legal system to prosecute left-wing activists, including 
students and actors, amongst them the future Nobel Prize winner Dario Fo. But, 
more importantly, Sossi had been targeted because of his role as public prosecutor 
in the trial of the Gruppo XXII Ottobre, a terrorist organization of communist 
inspiration. During the course of one ‘esproprio proletario’ (the jargon term for a 
robbery in the service of the cause) a member of the group, Mario Rossi, shot and 
killed a delivery man. By pure chance, the shooting was photographed by a student 
who was trying out his new camera and as a result, the group, including Rossi, 
was prosecuted and convicted. Judge Sossi, acting as prosecutor, demanded that 
the maximum sentence be administered and, consequently, Mario Rossi was given 
to a life sentence.
The kidnapping of Judge Sossi represented an escalation in the level of seriousness 
of BR activities. Amongst the captors was ‘il laureato’ (as Sossi called him), Alberto 
Franceschini, one of the historical leaders of the BR. Judge Sossi’s kidnapping bears 
some resemblance to the Moro kidnapping. As in that case, Sossi was tried by the 
BR; and as in that case, the state adopted the ‘linea della fermezza’, the ‘hard line’ 
according to which it would refuse to enter into any negotiation with the terrorists, 
even going as far as to try to impose a media blackout. But unlike the Moro case, 
the Sossi kidnapping did not lead to the murder of Judge Sossi, who was freed after 
thirty-five days of captivity. What is particularly interesting about the liberation of 
Judge Sossi is the way it was achieved: Sossi was freed thanks to the intervention of 
the Genoa Corte d’Assise d’Appello;3 the law was manipulated to achieve a result 
that could not be achieved through political discourse.
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Trials of victims and perpetrators
After the BR conducted their trial of Judge Sossi they demanded the liberation of 
eight members of the Gruppo XXII Ottobre in exchange for his life. According to 
his diary, it was when the BR made this demand that Sossi truly began to despair for 
his life. Sossi knew all too well that the state would not negotiate with the terrorists 
and would refuse an exchange of prisoners. For this reason, according to his diary, 
Sossi started thinking about ways in which he could address his situation. As we 
shall see, Sossi achieves his liberation by means of a skilful use of language: he starts 
from a moral premise, only to arrive at a legal imperative, and to eventually find in 
a perverse application of the law the solution to his problems. This dynamic can be 
seen in a message to the newspapers written in the early stages of his captivity:
Lo Stato [...] ha il dovere morale di tutelare me, e con me i miei cari, riparando 
così almeno in parte alle proprie gravi omissioni. La legge prevede la possibilità 
di attuare, oggi per ieri, tale doverosa tutela. Non intendo pagare gli altrui 
errori. Lo Stato, che ho sempre servito, ora, tutelando me, tutela se stesso e 
adempie a un preciso obbligo giuridico e morale.4
[The State has the moral duty to care for me, and by caring for me to care for 
my family, so as to, at least in part, remedy its own serious omissions. The law 
provides for the possibility to comply, nunc pro tunc, with that duty of care. 
The State, which I have always served, by now taking care of me, takes care of 
itself and complies with a specific legal and moral duty.]
As can be seen, starting from a moral premise Sossi comes to imply a legal duty of 
the state. In order to strengthen his request, he transforms a moral duty into a legal 
duty and, by doing so, he suggests that there is but one solution to his case, which 
is not open to discussion. Sossi in effect rebuts the premise according to which, if a 
legal duty exists, then the state cannot but abide by that duty. The hard line on non-
negotiation espoused by the state was justified by the premise that any negotiation 
would have weakened the state and compromised the rule of law, lo stato di diritto, 
upon which the state is founded. The very idea of the rule of law, even in its most 
minimal definition, is that all are subject to the law: if the state had accepted 
negotiation with the terrorists, then it would have allowed for a fracture in its own 
system by exempting some people (the convicted terrorists of the Gruppo XXII 
Ottobre) from the reach of the law. However, in his letter to the newspaper Sossi 
rebuts this presumption. If the state has a legal duty to act then not to act would in 
itself be a breach of the rule of law, as all are bound by law — and especially the 
state. At this stage Sossi had not yet devised the plan that would eventually lead 
to his liberation. He simply thought that the appropriate course of action was to 
proceed to a ‘colossale retata’, a mass prosecution against left-wing sympathizers so 
that those people could be used as a bargaining tool to free him and save his life.
However, he soon realized that the state, in the form of the political establishment, 
was unwilling to negotiate under any circumstances with the terrorists. According 
to his diary, it is when he was shown the newspapers that he realized that he needed 
to find an alternative solution:
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Come posso trovare una soluzione che, senza compromettere il prestigio dello Stato, 
induca i brigatisti a lasciarmi libero? Una soluzione della quale, ‘dopo’, io non 
debba pentirmi? [...] Da questo momento mi mostrerò con loro estremamente 
polemico nei confronti dell’esecutivo, dirò loro che hanno ragione, quando 
parlano male [del ministro dell’interno] Taviani, gli suggerirò di lasciar perdere 
il governo e di trattare solo con la magistratura. O meglio: che scelgano loro con 
chi trattare, ma operino, preventivamente, una netta distinzione tra i due poteri 
dello Stato.5
[How can I find a solution which, without compromising the State’s prestige, will 
persuade the terrorists to set me free? A solution which I shall not, ‘afterwards’, 
regret? […] From now on I will appear extremely polemical to them [the 
terrorists] with regard to the executive; I will tell them that they are right when 
they insult Taviani [the Home Secretary]; I will suggest that they forget about the 
State and negotiate only with the judiciary. Or better: let them choose with whom 
to negotiate, but they should first draw a firm distinction between the two powers 
of the State.]
He then talked to Franceschini about his idea. This is how Sossi recalls his dialogue 
with Franceschini:
Non è con il governo che dovete trattare, ma solo con la magistratura. E’ solo 
dalla magistratura che potete sperare di ottenere qualcosa. Dovete fare una 
scelta precisa. Se decidete di trattare con la magistratura, non potete più trattare 
con il potere politico, dovete escluderlo.6
[It is not with the Government that you should negotiate, but only with the 
judiciary. It is only from the judiciary that you can hope to obtain something. 
You have to make a precise choice. If you decide to negotiate with the judiciary, 
you can negotiate no longer with the political power, you have to exclude it.]
As we can see, there is a change of emphasis between the way Sossi first recalls 
his idea and the way he then recalls his dialogue with Franceschini, just a few 
sentences afterwards. In the first quotation his wording seems to be almost drawn 
from a constitutional textbook (‘che scelgano loro con chi trattare, ma operino, 
preventivamente, una netta distinzione tra i due poteri dello Stato’), in the sense of 
outlining the separation between judiciary and executive which lies at the heart 
of many democracies, and of the Italian constitutional system. However, in the 
second quote he counterposes the two powers, he asks Franceschini to make a choice, 
an either/or, as if these two powers were not complementing each other as separate 
powers of a unitary system, but rather as if they were opposing each other, as if 
they were powers in conf lict with one another. The terrorists can either enter into 
a dialogue with the judiciary, or enter into an (unsuccessful) dialogue with the 
political powers — they cannot negotiate with both.
The way Sossi recalls both his thoughts and his conversation with Franceschini 
might well not be accurate. However, that fact is not particularly relevant in 
analyzing the rhetoric used by the judge, by an emanation of the state. Sossi is 
suggesting the use of one of the powers of the state in direct opposition to another 
power of the state. In doing so he is using legal rhetoric against the state, fragmenting 
that unity which is crucial to any constitutional understanding of the state itself.
Sossi then suggests the instrumental use of the judiciary to achieve his freedom. 
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In a dialogue with Franceschini he reasons as follows: the Gruppo XXII Ottobre 
had been convicted following a ruling of the Corte d’Assise, upheld by the Genoa 
Corte d’Assise d’Appello; however, that ruling was not yet definitive since an appeal 
was pending before the Corte di Cassazione.7 Sossi then manipulates the situation 
to his advantage by suggesting that the Corte d’Assise d’Appello was the body 
responsible for the terrorists’ captivity since it, not the Government, had upheld 
the ruling of the Corte d’Assise. Therefore, he argued, it was not for the executive 
to release the terrorists, but for the Corte d’Assise d’Appello. For this reason, the 
terrorists should interact only with the judiciary, and through their lawyers, present 
a plea for conditional release of the detainees, relying on the provisions of the 
so-called ‘legge Valpreda’.8
The ‘Valpreda law’ was a piece of legislation which had been adopted following the 
arrest of Pietro Valpreda, an anarchist who had been investigated and was awaiting 
trial for the Piazza Fontana massacre. Even before his trial, it became evident that 
he was innocent. However, according to the law as it stood he could not be released 
pending trial, despite the fact that sufficient evidence had been gathered to indicate 
that he had been wrongly charged. To remedy this state of affairs, parliament 
enacted legislation providing for the possibility of provisional release pending trial.9 
Sossi thus suggested that the terrorists rely on the Valpreda legislation in order 
to obtain provisional release, since that legislation provided for the possibility of 
release not only pending trial, but also pending ‘final conviction’. As the case of the 
Gruppo XXII Ottobre was pending before the Corte di Cassazione, the Valpreda 
law was applicable. The terrorists’ lawyers never put forward such a plea; however, 
Sossi’s family decided to propose the plea themselves.
As a result, the Corte d’Assise d’Appello ordered the provisional release of the 
detainees;10 such a release was, however, conditional upon Sossi’s own release. It 
was obvious, even for those less accustomed to the nuances of the criminal legal 
system, that an ordinanza of this type could not be in conformity with legislation: 
the application of criminal law cannot be conditional upon external and unrelated 
circumstances. And it is likely that the court judges were fully aware that the 
ordinanza would and could not have taken effect. What is relevant for our purposes 
is that the Corte d’Assise d’Appello decided to use the law in an instrumental 
manner in order to achieve a result that should have been achieved through either 
political or legislative means.
The Corte d’Assise d’Appello was reacting to state inaction. Once again, a 
moral standpoint — that everything should be done to spare an innocent life — is 
transposed into legal discourse, in order to give it not so much a stronger moral 
basis, but rather the possibility of concrete execution. Indeed, it could be argued 
that, by allowing for a purely instrumental use of the law, the Court acted in clear 
conf lict with the rule of law. It is not surprising then that the Corte di Cassazione 
should declare the ordinanza a ‘legally non-existent’ act, because ‘abnorme’, ultra 
vires, clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.11 The language used 
by the Corte di Cassazione deserves some attention. The possibility that an act 
could be declared legally non-existent had been put forward by scholars; however, 
this was, as far as I am aware, the first time that such a doctrine was endorsed 
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by the Corte di Cassazione, and the very use of this doctrine assumes a different 
significance if seen from the viewpoint of rhetoric and narrative. If the ordinanza 
of the Corte di Appello had never existed, then the fracture created by such an act 
could easily be recomposed, and the separation of powers (powers held separate, i.e., 
in a unitary state) could be reinstated. If the act was ‘non-existent’, then the fracture 
never occurred.
The Sossi case is a very interesting illustration of the use of legal rhetoric and 
language by the state, in the form of the judiciary (both in the person of Sossi 
and of the Corte d’Assise d’Appello), against the state. Furthermore, Judge Sossi, a 
person who, in his role, should have been one of the main guarantors of the state’s 
legitimacy, helps the terrorists in articulating their standpoint against the state. It is 
to the terrorists’ rhetoric that we shall now turn our attention.
Terrorist language
In the Sossi case we have seen how legal language was used instrumentally against 
the state; in the case of the terrorists, on the other hand, the use of legal language 
highlights the tensions inherent in conducting an armed revolution, the aim of 
which is to subvert the state and its core values. Some of the values to be subverted, 
and especially the idea of rule of law, due process and so on, are also values which are 
very much part of the terrorists’ own heritage, and which therefore unsurprisingly 
tend to re-emerge in the terrorists’ own rhetoric. The terrorists, those who might 
have been expected to disregard any legal discourse, as the legal system cannot but 
be identified with the state, adopt legal language to ground themselves in the context 
in which they are operating. In this way, legal rhetoric might be used — even if not 
entirely consciously — in an attempt to provide some legitimacy, legitimacy which 
might be gained by adopting categories which are heritage of the system that the 
terrorists aim to displace and destroy. This very tension has been acknowledged by 
Mario Moretti in his interview with Rossana Rossanda and Carla Mosca.12 At a 
certain stage, the interviewers point out, that ‘ti opponi allo stato con i suoi mezzi, 
quelli che denunci. Gli somigli, l’ostaggio ridotto a niente, la ‘prigione’ del popolo, 
gli interrogatori’ [You oppose the state using its own means, those same means that 
you criticise. You resemble it [the State], the hostage reduced to a non-person, the 
“people’s prison”, the interrogations.]. To which Moretti answers:
Eh sì, questa è la terminologia che usiamo. Delle BR accetto tutto, anche 
quel che critico, nel bene come nel male, ma quel linguaggio no. ‘Nomina 
sunt consequentia rerum’, dice il filosofo, ma quelle parole non ci esprimono, ci 
falsificano. Non siamo quello. Le abbiamo mutuate dai codici ma non indicano le 
stesse cose. [...] Prigione del popolo, interrogatorio, processo non esprimono una 
pratica sociale decente. Ma non abbiamo altri mezzi, né altre parole.13
[Yes, this is the terminology we use. Of the BR I accept everything, the good 
and the bad things, and even those things that I criticise, but I do not accept 
that language. Nomina sunt consequentia rerum, as the philosopher says, but those 
words do not represent us, they falsify us. We are not that. We have taken 
those words from the [legal] code, but they do not indicate the same things. People’s 
prison, interrogation, trial do not express an adequate social practice. But we 
have no other means, no other words.]
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The best official example of this tension between the use of legal rhetoric and the 
aims of the lotta armata, is the fifth communication released by the BR during the 
Sossi kidnap, which was probably composed in direct response to Sossi’s discussions 
with Franceschini. The communication started with an attack on the then Home 
Secretary, Taviani, linking him to arms trafficking (which Sossi was investigating 
at the time of his kidnap), which ended thus:
NON TRATTIAMO CON I DELINQUENTI.
 È il momento in cui ciascuno si deve assumere le sue responsabilità. Spetta 
alla magistratura concedere la libertà provvisoria agli otto compagni del ‘XXII 
Ottobre’. Nella fase attuale è la Corte di Appello di Genova che deve decidere. 
In uno ‘stato di diritto’, fondato sulla separazione dei poteri, il governo non 
può minimamente interferire.
 Spetta alla magistratura decidere se rendersi complice o meno della volontà 
criminale del ministro dell’interno.14
[WE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH CRIMINALS.  
 Now is the time when everyone has to accept their own responsibilities. It is 
for the judiciary to grant provisional freedom to the comrades of ‘XXII Ottobre’. 
At this time, it is the Court of Appeal which has to decide. In a State governed 
by the ‘rule of law’, founded upon the separation of powers, the executive 
cannot interfere.        
 It is for the judiciary to decide whether or not to make themselves 
accomplices to the criminal will of the Home Secretary.]
Two things are worth pointing out in relation to this comunicato. First of all — and 
this appears clearly from the text — the BR rely on a notion, the rule of law, which 
characterizes the very system they want to abolish. In other words, they use a legal 
discourse both substantially and formally: substantially when they demand judicial 
rather than political action; formally, in relying on the rule of law to justify such a 
request. It is for the judiciary, they say, and only the judiciary, to decide whether the 
prisoners should be freed. The executive cannot interfere — it would be illegal, they 
almost say, for the government to interfere.
Secondly, it is clear that the BR are not only adopting and using Sossi’s trick to 
end the deadlock, but also his more personal views. The reference to the ‘volontà 
criminale’ of the Home Secretary is in this respect interesting. What are the BR 
referring to? Despite appearances, they cannot be referring to the decision to 
im prison the members of the Gruppo XXII Ottobre as that, of course, was the out-
come of a judicial trial. Therefore they must be referring to the Home Secretary’s 
decision, which was shared also by the executive and by Parliament (the legislature), 
to refuse any form of dialogue with the captors.
But even leaving aside the Sossi case, legal language and rhetoric inf luence, and 
are incorporated into, the terrorists’ own rhetoric. Consider their obsession with 
trying their prisoners, with the processo that inevitably and predictably results in 
the condanna. Why use this sort of legal discourse, when Moretti himself admits 
that should they have succeeded in their project, should have they succeeded in 
overthrowing the state, then in their system imprisonment without trial would have 
been justified? Why this inconsistency? It seems clear that there is a desire to be 
recognized as fair in the expression of their arbitrium. But it is a legal rhetoric, a legal 
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language to which they resort in order to do so: the state’s language. Or consider 
the terrorists’ statements to the effect that they considered themselves bound by the 
Geneva Convention on prisoners of war when treating their hostages;15 and that 
they wanted to be so treated before the Italian courts. Here we see the use of a legal 
discourse, however incorrect, for the pursuit of a political aim. The terrorists would 
have been worse off had Italy decided to apply the Geneva Convention rather than 
ordinary criminal law, since the former is less generous than the latter. But the 
Geneva Convention applies not only to traditional inter-state conf licts, but also 
to ‘armed conf licts not of an international character’.16 And the application of the 
Geneva Convention would have meant the very recognition of the ‘state of internal 
conf lict’ which was sought by the terrorists.
The use of legal rhetoric by the state
In considering the use of legal rhetoric by the state we enter into a territory where 
discussion within legal scholarship has been copious, and therefore I shall be brief, 
limiting myself to explaining the terms of the debate, and to providing a few 
examples taken from the anni di piombo. It is well known, and it has been mentioned 
above, that in dealing with both the Sossi and the Moro kidnappings, the state 
adopted a ‘linea della fermezza’, a firm ‘no negotiation’ approach. In defending this 
view, political power relied heavily on the idea of rule of law or stato di diritto, and 
references to the rule of law are abundant in narrative about the anni di piombo. It is 
therefore worth looking more closely at what rule of law actually means.
The rule of law is one of the most difficult concepts in legal theory. However we 
can identify two meanings which, broadly speaking, can be given to this elusive 
concept. The narrower and simplistic definition of rule of law is that ‘everyone is 
bound by law’, including the state and all its emanations.17 In this sense the ‘law 
rules’ and the state is founded upon the principle of legality. Here, the rule of law acts 
as a limit upon the discretion of the ruling class, be this a Parliamentary legislature 
or even a tyrant, in the sense of imposing upon everyone, even on the ruling class, 
the duty to respect the law. This formal view, however, tells us nothing about the 
content of legislation. For example, dictatorships often abide by the rule of law in its 
formal sense — all that the dictator has to do is to change the legislation.
However, when we refer to the rule of law, lo stato di diritto, in common discourse, 
we do so in a prescriptive, rather than just a formalistic sense. In other words we point 
at some quality that the legislation must possess for it to be consistent with the rule 
of law. In this sense, the rule of law imposes a broader constraint on the legislature: 
the legislation must not only be adopted following the appropriate procedures, but it 
must also possess some given qualities, so that it is not perceived as being arbitrary, 
so that it is consistent with our understanding of fairness. For instance, legislation 
in breach of the principle of equality would, in contemporary liberal democracies, 
be seen as inconsistent with the rule of law. And here the problems start, since those 
inherent qualities which are considered pre-conditions for the rule to be consistent 
with a substantive idea of rule of law must be identified. In those states with a 
written constitution this is done to a certain extent within the constitution itself, 
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which identifies the basic values upon which the state is founded. However, the 
constitution in itself does not solve the problem of which qualities must be possessed 
by the legislation in order to comply with a substantive idea of rule of law, since 
the Constitution itself is a positive act, a legislative act which is open to change and 
interpretation. It is then a matter of debate whether the very notion of the rule of 
law, in its qualitative meaning, can ever be apolitical, if we use the term apolitical 
loosely to indicate the result of a wider debate and discourse which is occurring 
in a given society. In other words, it is debatable whether there can be an absolute 
independent moral quality with which legislation must conform.
The elusiveness of the concept of the rule of law and the tension between the 
two meanings becomes visible in relation to the debate about terrorism, be it the 
debate about the anni di piombo or the debate about religious terrorism which has 
characterized the political scene in recent years. In relation to the anni di piombo, 
the Italian state relied on the rule of law to justify its decision not to negotiate 
with the terrorists: all are bound by law and there is no possibility of suspending 
criminal law in special cases, as to do so would effectively mean that the law applies 
to nearly everyone but not to all. Therefore legal rhetoric is used here as a shield 
to provide a justification for what is, at the end of the day, a political decision. The 
use of legal concepts, of a formal notion of rule of law, catapults a political decision 
into an ostensibly objective framework, meaning that it cannot be counteracted 
with moral or political arguments. A very good example of this instrumental use 
of law to avoid adopting a political/moral approach is again to be found in relation 
to the Sossi case. The wife of Mario Sossi, clearly worried for her husband’s life, 
pleaded unsuccessfully with several members of the Government, as well as with 
the President of the Republic. Eventually, she wrote to Amintore Fanfani, then 
President of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Her telegram, published in the 
newspapers, was sent just few days before the referendum on the abolition of the 
divorce legislation. In her message Grazia Sossi wrote:
Nel momento in cui vostra eccellenza è massimamente impegnata nella 
battaglia per salvare l’unità della famiglia, la prego caldamente di intervenire 
per compiere ogni tentativo affinché la mia famiglia non venga distrutta.18
[At a time when you, Sir, are heavily engaged in the battle to safeguard the 
unity of the family, I beg you to intervene to make all possible attempts to 
ensure that my family is not destroyed.]
The DC’s fight against divorce then becomes a useful weapon in the Sossi family’s 
hands. Fanfani, in his speech in ‘defence’ of the family could therefore not ignore 
Grazia Sossi’s plea; he stated:
Occorre cercare nelle leggi la soluzione per salvare Sossi. [...] la difesa completa 
della famiglia richiede la tutela più severa e tempestiva della sicurezza pubblica. 
[...] Anche nel caso che dilania una famiglia genovese, offende la magistratura, 
irride la legge, provoca lo Stato democratico, la via d’uscita resta quella del rispetto 
delle leggi, attingendo a tutto ciò che possono dare per restiture la libertà a un 
cittadino [...], per non aggiungere un’altra tappa alla strada pericolosa sulla quale 
ci hanno inoltrato troppe norme permissive, troppe facili interpretazioni di esse, troppe 
dimenticanze dei doveri che sempre accompagnano i diritti.19
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[We need to find a legal solution to save Sossi. The complete defence of the 
family requires the strictest and speediest safeguard from public security. Even 
in the context of events that are devastating a family from Genoa, events that 
offend the judiciary, jeer at the law, and insult the democratic state, the means of 
exit remains that of respect of the law. One must draw from all that the law can do 
to return his freedom to a citizen; one must avoid taking even a single further 
step along the dangerous path of permissive regulation and too liberal interpretation 
of those regulations, the path of forgetting that duties always accompany rights.]
Fanfani’s speech is interesting not only from a political viewpoint. In his speech 
he is relying on a legal argument to defeat the other legal argument upon which 
the political establishment has relied in order to justify inaction. If the political 
establishment relied on legal notions, such as the rule of law, to justify what 
was, essentially, a political decision, Fanfani advocated the use of the law to save 
Sossi’s life, in defiance of previous statements. But, this instrumental use of legal 
language by experienced politicians is not in itself surprising. What is interesting 
about Fanfani’s speech is the inherent conf lict and tension in his use of legal 
rhetoric; because as Fanfani is advocating using the law to free Judge Sossi, he is 
also advocating a tougher use of the law against terrorists and, most likely, against 
their sympathizers. So on the one hand Fanfani advocated what could be termed a 
twisted, if not altogether illegal, use of the law, i.e., a very lax interpretation of the 
relevant provisions which clearly went against the very spirit of such legislation; on 
the other hand, he also advocated a very strict interpretation of existing legislation 
against the perpetrators. So legal rhetoric is seen to suit any purpose. Using legal 
language everything and its opposite can be said, even in the same sentence, as if to 
suggest that the law were in the eye of the beholder.
At the same time as the state was heavily relying on the concept of the rule of law 
to justify its unwillingness to negotiate with the terrorists, it also enacted a series of 
special measures, starting with the ‘legge Reale’, which repealed the Valpreda law 
and extended the powers of the police, and then proceeded to the anti-terrorism 
legislation enacted in 1978. In these cases the state relies on the defence of the 
democratic state as a justification for emergency legislation; in doing so, however, 
the state embraces a very limited, formalistic view of the rule of law, which deprives 
the expression of any meaningful significance.
So in the state-led debate about terrorism, be it defensive (i.e. no negotiation 
with the terrorists) or offensive (i.e., when the state enacts special legislation to 
counteract the real or perceived terrorist threat), the idea of rule of law is used also 
to avoid a more wide-ranging moral and political debate. In the former case, that 
debate is avoided by simply relying on the legal notion to justify inaction; in the 
latter case, by relying on the need to defend the state from a threat by disposing of 
the very values which are at the core of a substantive, and therefore meaningful, use 
of the concept of the rule of law.
I would like to conclude with a quotation from the first letter sent by Aldo Moro 
to Francesco Cossiga, which serves as a good example of those tensions:
la dottrina per la quale il rapimento non deve recare vantaggi [for the kid-
nappers], discutibile già nei casi comuni, dove il danno del rapito è estremamente 
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probabile, non regge in circostanze politiche, dove si provocano danni sicuri e 
incalcolabili non solo alla persona, ma allo Stato. Il sacrificio degli innocenti in 
nome di un astratto principio di legalità, mentre un indiscutibile stato di necessità 
dovrebbe indurre a salvarli, è inammissibile.20
[The doctrine according to which kidnapping should not lead to any advantages 
[for the hostage takers] — debatable even in relation to ordinary cases where 
injury to the kidnapped person is very likely — does not hold in political 
circum stances. In this case the damage, certain and incommensurable, is 
inf licted not only upon the individual, but also upon the State. The sacrifice of 
an innocent in the name of an abstract principle of legality, when an unquestion able 
state of necessity should lead to saving that individual, is inadmissible.]
In the anni di piombo legal rhetoric is appropriated by all the main actors, to achieve 
different and contrasting goals. The kidnapped person, the terrorists and the state all 
seem to meet in a semantic market place where meaning is negotiated and reinter-
preted by the different actors. Legal rhetoric, and the manner of its use, can then be 
seen as a metaphor for the tensions and the divisions that characterize the broader 
political and moral discourse in those years.
* I am grateful to Andrea Biondi for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this 
essay.
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